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SITUATION I 
BELLIGERENT AND NEUTRAL RIGHTS IN 
REGARD TO AIRCRAFT 
States X and Y are at war. Other states are 
neutral. All states concerned are parties to the 
# conventions relating to the conduct of aircraft as 
ratified by the Pan-American Conferences, and 
respect the generally accepted principles of 
i11ternational law. 
(a) It is know11 that an aircraft, B-17, regis-
tered in state B, has carried to state X articles of 
the nature of contraband. 
(b) It is known that an aircraft, C-12, regis-
tered in state 0, has flown to a port 0 in state X 
above the line of vessels, submarines and aircraft, 
maintaini11g a blockade of port 0. 
(c) It is known that an aircraft, D-20, regis-
tered in stateD, has carried i11 the regular air mail 
from port 0 to port N, an unblockaded port of 
state X, military messages, funds, and some light 
but essential military materials. 
(d) It is known that an aircraft, E-30, regis-
tered in state E, has carried essential military ma-
terials to Forta, a town in state F near the frontier 
of state X, and that some of these materials were 
immediately shipped to state X. 
(e) It is known that an aircraft, G-40, regis-
tered in state G, has under special charter carried 
General Xano of the .Army of X from a port in 
state G to the 1nilitary headquarters of state X. 
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These aircraft, severally, later, \vhe11 above the 
high sea, are within a11 easy range of the guns of 
the Y -2, a Inilitary aircraft i11 state Y. 
What 111ay the Y -2 la,vfully do in each case~ 
SOLUTION 
I11 each insta11ce the Y -2 n1ay la,vfully visit and 
search the neutral aircraft. 
(a) The B.-17 should be released. 
(b) If the Y -2 is a n1ember of the blockading 
squadron and if it 111eets the C-12 \vhile the latter 
is engaged on the return voyage, the C-12 should be 
seized and held for prize court adjudication. If 
the Y-2 encounters the C-12 after the latter has 
completed the round trip journey, the C-12 should 
be released. If the Y -2 is not a mernber of the 
blockading squadron but meets the C-12 \vhile the 
latter is on the return trip, the C-12 may be seized 
and held for prize court adju'dication. 
(c) Tl1e D-20 shol1ld be released. 
(d) The E-30 shollld be released. 
(e) If the G-40 is no longer under special char-
ter a11d if it has completed the jour11ey for \Vhich 
it \vas hired, it should be released. 
NOTES 
A.ir law 'i?~ gene1Yll.-A.t the present tin1e there 
are no binding conventional international law rules 
regulating the conduct of airplanes in war time. 
The 11eed for effective la\v on this subject is great 
indeed, and it is to be hoped that the situation can 
be remedied in the near future. The use of air-
planes i11 the Spanish Civil conflict and in the Sino-
Japanese struggle has brought the law's gaps very 
· vividly to public atte11tion. Also the constant 
PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS 3 
111enace and threat of air bombardment in a future 
\Var emphasizes the necessity for the development 
of international air la\v. Strictly speaking, there-
fore, since no binding rules exist, the Y -2 might 
technically be permitted to do anything it pleased 
with the assorted neutral craft herein involved. 
The \Vord "lawfully'' \Vill be construed, however, 
as implying the existence of legal pri11ciples, and 
the solutions \Vill be reached in part by carrying 
#over analogies from land and marine warfare into 
the air. As will be indicated later, the air weapon 
is sui ge1~eris in many respects, so that analogies 
are not always applicable, btlt they are none the 
less extremely useful in the formulation of the 
required rules. 
Naval War College d-isc~tss-ions.-The subject of 
air law has been considered previously in Naval 
vVar College situations, notably, in 1928, 1935, and 
1936. As was stated in the 1936 situation: 
The introduction of aircraft as a means of warfare greatly 
1nodified the conduct of 'var upon the earth surface, on the 
"~ater as 'vell as on land. The earlier rules for warfare 'vere 
concerned with surface combat. These rules could not in 
every instance be extended by analogy to aerial ·warfare, be-
cause the forms of warfare "~ere not analogous. There was 
an atteinpt on the part of son1e 'vriters to extend the three 
Inile maritime jurisdiction doctrine to the superjacent air. 
In this attempt the early recognition of the fact that the 
law· of gravity did not act horizontally and vertically in 
the saine manner, destroyed the analogy. Differences in 
speed and in other respects introduced other complications 
in atteinpts to extend maritin1e and land rules to the air. 
Aircraft "·ere coining n1ore and more to be used in war; 
therefore, rules had to be devised. The 'Vorld War expe-
riences and probleins contributed valuable basal data for the 
deterinination of the nature of possible regulation of use of 
aircraft. The equipment of aircraft with radio introduced 
other problems. (International I.Ja 'v Situations, 1936, p. 39.) 
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Can 7 egal' restraints on air 1varjare be ?na.de ~­
rJ,he feeling has beell prevalent in some quarters 
that efforts to Ctlrb the tlse of aircraft in \var are 
doon1ed to. failure because this ne'v \veapon is so 
po\verftll that 110 belligerent \VOllld be \Villing to 
restrict the en11)loyine11t of this military ar1n. The 
deYastation and destruction \vhich airplanes may· 
bring about, so the argument l'Uils, \vill be so effec-
t ive in bri11ging the oppo11ent to terms that here-
after the sanctions for restraint 'vill no longer be 
operative. Further, ·"the. possibilities of· "totali-
tariail'' \vars bet,veeil rival ideological grollps 
n1akes it appear to some people that ctlrbs \Vould 
be of 110 value. This hypothesis that ruthless11ess 
"ill "pay" a11d that legal restrictio11s \vill be foot-
less, deserves examination. 
The arguments in favor of putti11g restrai11ts 011 
the use of aircraft may be summed tlp as follo\vs: 
1. In the past, devastation has al,vays been illegal 
\vhen it has not been of n1ilitary advantage. It l1as 
11ot profited a belligerent to destroy 1nore life and 
1)roperty than he 11eeds for the attainment of l1is 
1nilitary objective, namely, the subjection of the 
enemy. If a belligerent \Vins a verdict over a still 
prosperous foe, he is the richer and derives more 
be11efit than if he had defeated a starved and 
exhausted enemy. 
There 1nust be some reasonably close connection bet,veen 
the destruction of property and the overcoming of the 
enemy's ar1ny. (~fanual, Rules of Land "\Varfare, 1914, 
Section 334.) 
The object of 'var in the 1nilitary sense is to procure the 
co1nplete submission of the enemy at the earliest possible 
period w·ith the least possible expenditure of men and money. 
(\,Tilson and Tucker, International r~aw, 9th Edition, p. 250.) 
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2. It is also always bee11 held that it is to the 
adva11tage of all belligerents not to lapse i11to 
barbarism. 
The advantage of having and of n1aintaining a regime 
under w·hich the more gross and calamitous varieties of 
Schrecklichkeit are banned, will be apparent to the man on 
the street-who ·will be himself affected-and, one hopes, 
even to the 1nost 1nilitarist governinents. ( J. M. Spaight~ 
Airpower and War Rights, Second Edition, 1933, p. 29.) 
3. There has tlsually been also a certain amount 
of 11atural chivalry and humanitarianisn1 in \VaT-
fare. These have tlnderlain ma11y of the \Var 
rules, the assumptio11 being that there are certain 
things which human beings will not do to one. an-
other even in the heat of strife . 
... ~irships frequently returned :from their expeditions 'vith 
their :full complement o:f bo1nbs, because they haYe not been 
able to make out certain targets ''ith sufficient accuracy. It 
"-ould have been easy enough :for the1n before returning to 
get rid o:f their bon1bs and drop them on any place oYer 
which they happened to fly, i:f they w·anted to kill harmless 
citizens. ( Spaight, op. cit., p. 14.) 
4. Another sanction for the laws of \Var has been 
the fear of retaliation. Restraint upon a belliger-
ent has thus often been in1posed by a dread of 
reprisals. Though these 'latter have never bee11 
successfully regulated by lavv, they have operated 
as a deterrent to lawless action. 
5. In the case of air warfare it has often bee11 
contended that indiscri111inate bo1nbing only stiff-
ellS the resistance of the e11e111y popula tio11, 
a11d that rt1thless11ess, tl1erefore, carries \Vith it its 
o\vn sa11ction. If this \Vere so universally there 
\vould be no military advantage i11 \Vholesale air 
bo111bardn1e11t of Cl'O\vded cities and innocent 
l)O})Ula tions. 
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~rhe sanctions for the la\vs of \Yar have thus 
rested upo11 com1non sense and practical consider-
ations. Rules a11d conve11tions \vhich stray far 
fron1 the realities of belligerent strife become 
fruitless 1noral injunctions, but ethics and 111ilitary 
necessities frequently con1bine, as abo·ve sho\vn, 
i11to imposing, se11sible restraints u p011 a bel-
ligerent. 
A ·ir 1va1·fare and the sanct-ions of the la1vs of 1var. 
-~t\..s previollsly indicated, the belief is current 
an1ong various groups that the custo111ary sanctions 
do not and ca11110t operate \vhere air co111bat is con-
cerned. These argun1ents 1nay be summarized as 
follO\VS: 
1. Contrary to the thesis that rutllless-bonlbard-
nlei1t merely increases a natio11 's \Vill to resist, is 
the vie\V that devastation may in ti1ne \Veake11 the 
morale of a belligerent state. The bombardments 
of Barcelona of March 1938, and the use of gas 
from the air by the Italians in Ethiopia are cited 
as exa1nples of the \vay in \Vl1ich \Var from the sky 
ca11 undermine tl1e fighting spirit. The nerve-rack-
ing te11sion, the sleepless nights, the perpetual sense 
of insecurity, the nightmare of sudden death in 
one's O\Vn home or in those of friends and relatives, 
act as corrosives upon the iron vvill and tend to 
n1ake a people \VOllder \Vhether the ideals for \Vhicl1 
they think they are figl1ting are \Vorth this holo-
caust and carnage. 
It is not altogether true that the bon1bing of England had 
no In oral effect for by n1oral effect is not 1neant only a sud-
den~ craven desire to surrender; and secondly, that air at-
tacks on the large centers of populations \vere 1nerely side 
·sho"·s in 1915-18, \vhereas in the next \Yar they \viii be a 
pri1nary operation * ::: *. Xo doubt on the \vhole, Lon-
don took the air raids \vith dignity and co1nposure, but no 
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one 'vho is acquainted 'vith the facts can adn1it that the 
people who left London to crowd into :Niaidenhead, Man-
chester, Brighton, and other safer towns, 'vere exclusively 
"Se,vs and Aliens." (Spaight, op. cit., pp. 8 and 9.) 
2. 011 the grounds of military necessity it is de-
nied by many that there is no military advantage 
in bon1bing food s11pplies, con1munication centers, 
crops and civilia11 homes. This is to say that the 
line between military requirements and useless 
#civilian da111age can no longer be drawn. Wide 
scale air operations dealing death indiscriminately, 
and paralyzing normal civilian operations, may 
have a definite military objective, in that the war 
n1ay be shortened. This line of reasoning is allied 
to the discussion above about civilian 1norale be-
cause 'vhatever tends to cause civilian resistance 
to crumble rnay be regarded as having a military 
objective. This of course is broadening the con-
cept of military necessity in a fasl1i011 seldom pre-
viously tolerated. The effectiveness of the air-
plane, however, is so great and its potentialities 
for dealing deadly blows are so vast that it is said 
that air bombardments cannot be compared to the 
''unnecessary'' da111age committed by la11d and sea 
forces 'vhere the destruction is relatively so i11sig-
11ificant that it really do,es not "pay" and only 
causes useless loss llnconnected witl1 any geillline 
'veake11ing of morale and resista11ce. 
If * ::: * so1ne but not an excessive loss of life can be 
sho,vn to be involved in operations 'vhich 'vill enorn1ously 
abbreviate the periods of 'vars and 'vill reduce to a compara-
tively trivial total the casualty lists and the huge but incal-
culable sum of indirect losses consequent upon hostilities, it 
could be argued that hun1anity 'vill gain and not lose fron1 
the recognition of the legiti1nacy of the ne'v method. 
(Spaight, op. cit., p. 81.) 
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3. As for chivalry, it is said that 'vhe11 ideologies 
clash the usual bu1nai1itaria11 feelings vvill be sub-
Jnergecl. Ho,Y, runs the query, ca11 a Fascist a11d a 
Co1nmunist be expected to deal lil\:e gentlemen 'vith 
011e a11other \Vhe11 the only obligation \Vhich they 
feel is that of exterminating 011e another. .As 
Spaight says ''Conde111natio11 or approval of any 
given bombardn1ent \Viii tend to vary "rith the ideo-
logical bias of the con11neutator upon it". (The 
19th Ce11tnry, Sept. 1938. Vol. 124, No. 739.) 
4. Whe11 it comes to retaliatio11 as a sanction, 
those opposi11g the attempt to regulate air \Varfare 
declare that if a11 air-minded belligere11t is quick 
enough and ruthless enough, he can give the enemy 
such a blow at the outset that there will be no pos-
sibility for retaliatio11. Reprisals are a sanction 
only if the other side has the physical strength to 
threater1 the1n. Therefore, a belligerent \vhich has 
overwhelming supre1nacy i11 the air, a11d which can 
lay waste his opponent, 11eed fear 110 retaliation and 
can hope for a speedy victory. These are the 
thoughts a11d dreams of those proposing the ''War 
of Terror" which has the support of some strat-
egists in son1e countries. 
Despite the cogency of son1e of these argume11ts, 
it is still \Vorth atten1pting to elaborate some rules. 
The unrestricted \Var of the skies has 1nany dev-
otees and tl1eir })lea fo1· a relaxation of the cus-
toinary restraints has a certai11 plausibility, but it 
cannot be presu1ned \vithout n1ore experience and 
evidence that air \varfare will be exempt fron1 the 
sanctions \vhich land and sea con1batants have 
al,vays encollntered. To date, the existence of 
1·ules has been found to be of advantage. Upo11 
that basis the effort to forn1ulate a practical code 
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of the air should go foT\vard, the drafters always 
bearing in mind the special nature of aircraft and 
the need for practical considerations. Eve11 if a 
code between belligerents seems of dubious efficacy, 
there would be an obvious linprovement in the re-
latioilS betwee11 belligerents and neutrals if law on 
this topic \vere developed. A belligerent may well 
fear 1~eutral retaliation, if not that of his oppo11ent, 
• a11d there "rould be a gain to all states througl1 the 
making of effective regulatio11s. 
Actual and projected conventions a1~d rules [o1· 
the a,ir.-The first rule concerning air \Varfare was 
drafted at the First Hague Peace Co11ference in 
1899. That convention prohibited the discharge 
of l)rojectiles fro1n bailoo11S for a period of 5 years. 
Before the convening of the second Hague co11fer-
ence in 1907, 1nany states sa\v son1e of the possi-
bilities of air \Varfare, and were therefore llnwill-
ing to renew their adherence to the 1899 co11ven-
tion. The only other pre-V\7ar regulation of air 
con1bat is found i11 Article 25 of Co11vention IV, 
Respecting the La\vs and Customs of War on Land, 
\Vhich stipulated that '' 'The attack or bombard-
n1ent, by 1chatever 1neans, of towns, villages, habi-
tations, or buildings \Yhich are not defe11ded, is pro-
hibited." Much dispute has raged as to \Vhether 
this article, bei11g a part of a land con·vention, 
covers the air, though the words "whatever 1neans" 
\VOUld seen1 to be llather con1prehensive. rrhe de-
bate as to the i11tent of this regulation seems rather 
futile in a11y event, because only undefe11ded 
places are iiill11Ulle, a11d it is never hard for bellig-
ere11ts to discover that a particular place \vhich 
they \Vish to bon1bard is actually '' defe11ded.'' 
1G73~:1-40-~ 
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'J'his san1e 1)roblen1 as to what is defended and 
\Yhat is not, arose in com1ectioi1 with Article I of 
Hague Conve11tio11 IX concer11ing naval boinbard-
Jnent. During the "rorld ,yar, tl1erefore, there 
\Vas little effective legal regulatio11 of air \Varfare 
\vhich increased in Inagnitude and importa11ce so 
tre1nendously at that time. 
There was uncertainty before 1914 also as to 
jurisdiction over the air, son1e contending that the 
air above a certain height should be free, each 
subjace11t state havi11g an air belt con1parable to 
1nargi11al seas. The regulations of neutrals dur-
ing the \Var and the experiences of that conflict 
gave impetus to the for1nulatio11 of the pres~nt 
rule that each subjacent state has con1plete juris-
diction over all the air space above it. The absurd-
ity of a11 air belt in the light of the la\vs of physics 
\Vhicl1 decree that a11 object dropped fron1 a great 
height will hit harder than a11 object dropped 
11carer the ground soo11 became n1anifest and post-
\Var conventions and drafts have recognized each 
state's jurisdiction up to the heavens. 
Post-u;ar conve1~tions and tJroposals.-A num-
ber of treaties have bee11 made since the \Var which 
lay do\Yll rules for aircraft in peace ti1ne. The first 
of these \vas the Conventio11 on the Regulation 
of Aerial Navigation of 1919 \Yhich states in Ar-
ticle I: 
T'he high contracting parties recognize that eYery pow·er 
has co1nplete and exclusiYe soYereignty oYer the air space 
n.hoYe its territory. 
Another note\Yortby convention \vas that m.ade 
in Habana in 1928 on Co111111ercial Aviation, and 
though its provisions are not designed for \Var, the 
follo,ving articles are releva11t to this discussion: 
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ARTICLE 3. The follo,ving shall be deen1ed to be state air 
craft: 
(a) lVlilitary and Naval aircraft. 
(b) Aircraft exclusively e1nployed in state service, such 
as posts, custon1s, police. 
Every other aircraft shall be dee1ned to be a private air-
craft. 
All state aircraft other than 1nilitary, naval, customs, and 
police aircraft shall be treated as private aircraft and as 
such shall be subject to all the provisions of the present 
.- convention. 
Follovving the W ashi11gto11 Limitation of Arms 
Conference of 1922 a co1nmission of jurists met at 
The Hague and drafted .a convention on air 'var-
fare. In this conventio11 the criterion of defended 
or undefended was abandoned, and air bombard-
ment was regulated i11 tern1s of objectives. The 
framers of these rules definitely prohibited indis-
criminate bombardment, a11d endeavored to furnish 
a precise definition of the objectives which alone 
may be attacked. The following articles of this 
draft are the ones most relevant to this discussion: 
ARTICLE 6. ( 1) The transmission by radio by a vessel or 
an aircraft, whether enemy or neutral, 'vhen on or over the 
high seas of military intelligence for the immediate use of 
a belligerent is to be deen1ecl a hostile act and 'vill render 
the vessel or aircraft liable to be fired upon. 
(2) A neutral vessel or neutral aircraft 'vhich transmits 
"·hen on or over the high seas information destined for a 
belligerent concerning military operations or military forces 
shall be liable to capture. The Prize Court may conde1nn 
the vessel or aircraft if it considers that the circumstances 
justify condemnation. 
(3) Liability to capture of a neutral vessel or aircraft on 
account of the acts referred to in paragraphs ( 1) and ( 2) 
is not extinguished by the conclusion of the voyage or flight 
on 'vhich the vessel or aircraft 'vas engaged at the time, 
but shall subsist for a period of one year after the act con1-
plained of. 
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.A.RTICLE 30. In case a belligerent co1nn1anding officer con-
siders that the presence of aircraft is likely to prejudice 
the success of the operations in which he is engaged at the 
n1o1nent, he 1nay prohi'Qit the passing of neutral aircraft 
in the in11nediate vicinity of his forces or 1nay oblige the1n 
to follo'v a particular route. A neutral aircraft 'vhich does 
not confor1n to such directions, of 'vhich he has had notice 
issued by the belligerent con11nanding officer, 1nay be fired 
upon . 
. A.~TICLE 37. :\Ie1nbers of the cre'v of a neutral aircraft 
"·hich has been detained by a belligerent shall be released 
unconditionally, if they are neutral nationals and not in 
the service of the ene1ny. If they are enemy nationals or 
in the service of the enen1y, they 1nay be made prisoners of 
"·ar. 
Passengers are entitled to be released unless they are in 
the service of the enerny or are enemy nationals fit for mili-
tary service, in 'vhich cases they 1nay be made prisoners of 
"·ar. 
Release 1nay in any case be delayed if the 1nilitary in-
terests of the belligerent so require. 
The belligerent 1nay hold as prisoners of w·ar any In em-
her of the crew or any passenger w· hose service in a flight 
at the close of which he has been captured has been of 
special and active assistance to the enemy. 
ARTICLE 49. Private aircraft are liable to visit and search 
and to capture by belligerent military aircraft . 
. A.RTICLE 50. Belligerent 1nilitary aircraft have the right 
to order public non-n1ilitary and private aircraft to alight 
in or proceed for visit and search to a suitable locality rea-
sonably accessible. 
Refusal, after warning, to obey such orders to alight or 
to proceed to such a locality for exan1ination expo~es an air-
era ft to the risk of being fired upon . 
.. A.RTICLE 53 ...... <\.. neutral private aircraft is liable to capture 
if it-
( a) Resists the legiti1nate exercise of belligerent rights. 
(b) Violates a prohibition of 'vhich it has had notice issued 
by a belligerent co1nmancling officer under article 30. 
(c) I s engaged in unneutral service. 
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(d) Is armed in time of war 'vhen outside the jurisdiction 
·of its own country. 
(e) Has no external marks or uses false n1arks. 
(f) Has no papers or insufficient or irregular papers. 
(g) Is manifestly out of the line between the point of 
departure and the point of destination indicated in its papers 
and after such enquiries as the belligerent may deen1 neces-
sary, no good cause is shown for the deYiation. The aircraft, 
together with its cre'v and passengers, if any, n1ay be detained 
by the belligerent, pending such enquiries. 
(h) Carries, or itself constitutes, contraband of war. 
( i) Is engaged in breach of a blockade duly established and 
-effectively maintained. 
( k) Has been transferred from belligerent to neutral na-
tionality at a date and in circumstances indicating an inten-
tion of evading the consequences to which an ene1ny aircraft, 
as such, is exposed. 
Provided, That in each case (except ( lc) ) the ground for 
·capture shall be an act carried out in the flight in which the 
neutral aircraft came into belligerent hands, i. e., since it left 
its point of departure and before it reached its point of 
destination. 
ARTICLE 56. A private aircraft captured upon the ground 
that it has no external marks or is using false 1narks, or that 
it is armed in tilne of war outside the jurisdiction of its own 
country, is liable to condemnation. 
A neutral private aircraft captured upon the ground that 
it has disregarded the direction of a belligerent commanding 
officer under article 30 is liable to condemnation, unless it can 
justify its presence within the prohibited zone. 
In all other cases, the prize court in adjudicating upon any 
·case of capture of an aircraft or its cargo, or of postal corre-
spondence on board an aircraft, shall apply the sa1ne rules as 
would be applied to a Inerchant vessel or its cargo or to postal 
·correspondence on board a merchant vessel. 
ARTICLE 58. Private aircraft 'vhich are found upon' visit 
.and search to be neutral aircraft liable to condemnation upon 
the ground of unneutral service, or upon the ground that 
they have no external marks or are bearing false n1arks, n1ay 
be destroyed, if sending then1 in for adjudication would be 
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i1npossible or "~auld iinperil the sa:fety of the belligerent 
aircraft or the success of the operations in 'vhich it is engaged. 
Apart from the cases 1nentioned above, a neutral private air-
craft 1nust not be destroyed except in the gravest 1nilitary 
e1nergency, 'vhich "~auld not justify the officer in co1n1nancl 
in releasing it or sending it in for adjudication. 
This last article is similar to Article 49 of the 
Declaratio11 of Lo11don which is as follows: 
As an exception a neutral vessel captured by a belligerent 
ship and "~hich would be liable to condemnation, may be 
destroyed if the observance of Article 48 "~auld involve dan-
ger to the ship of "\var or to the success of the operation in 
'vhich she is at the tin1e engaged. 
In all these proposals for dealing 'vith aircraft . 
the rules are either analogies or adaptations of an-
alogies draw11 from the generally accepted rules of 
naval and land warfare. Do these analogies hold~ 
Should special rights be conferred upon airplanes~ 
The ansvver frequently given is to the effect that 
special weaknesses or special ability do not bring 
special immllnities or special privileges, and that 
ne'v 'veapons n1ust adapt themselves to the already 
accepted rules. Some modifications, however, are 
in order. Manifestly visit and search of an air-
plane by an airplane is quite different from a sim-
ilar process on the surface. Deviation in certain 
circumsta11ces must therefore be allo,ved, and in 
general, the fact that airplanes operate in a three 
dimensional realm, means that old regulations 1nust 
take COgilizance of the new physical problems. 
Prelin~inar-y Harvard draft code.-Recently, re-
search in international law under the auspices of 
the Harvard La'v School has bee11 111ade concern-
ing rights a11d duties of neutral states in naval and 
aerial war. Though the research draft is not offi-
cial, the follo,ving article, No. 111, gives an indica-
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tion of the trend i11 adapting established principles 
to the needs of the new agency: 
( 1) A belligerent con11nissioned military aircraft 1nay 
signal a merchant vessel to stop as by radio or by firing a 
1nachine gun burst across its bo"~s. 
(2) If sea conditions permit the aircraft to alight, the 
aircraft shall alight and the procedure applicable to surface 
vessels shall be follo,ved. 
(3) If the belligerent aircraft is unable to alight, it 1nay 
require the vessel to proceed on its course under instructions 
as to speed until the sea 1noderates or until a naval vessel of 
the belligerent appears; if visit and search are not effected 
by either n1eans 'vithin six hours, or if the aircraft does not 
retnain 'vithin sight or hearing of the merchant vessel, the 
vessel may resu1ne its course at nor1nal speed. 
( 4) If the vessel when summoned does not stop, attetnpts 
to escape, resists visit and search, or does not proceed ac-
cording to instructions, it n1ay be cotnpelled by force to stop 
and the belligerent shall not be responsible for resulting 
injury to life or property. 
Assumptions in this case.-In arriving at the 
solutions of the problems presented, it has bee11 as-
stlnled that the neutral plane in each case is either 
a · private plane or is to be treated as such. (See 
Art. III of Habana Convention op. cit.) It is 
further assumed that the papers of these planes 
are in order, that the craft are plainly marked, 
that it has bee11 possible to signal understandably 
for visit and search, that all parties have agreed 
upon the definition of contraband, that an effec-
tive blockade is being maintained, that the neu-
trals knew of the blockade, and that the pla11es 
were all unarmed. It is therefore possible no'v to 
leave the general considerations and to take tlp the 
specific issues raised i11 this situation. 
Vt~sit and sectrch by airplanes.-It is agreed in 
principle that belligerent airplanes have the right 
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to visit and search 11ot onlv neutral surface vessels 
&I 
but also 11eutral aircraft. Agreen1ent upo11 the 
a.pplt"cation of the principle i11 actual practice is 
difficult to achieve, diverge11t views having been 
propounded in various quarters at different ti1nes. 
At the meeti11g of the jurists at The Hague in 1923 
the delegations were 11ot i11 harmony on this point 
of the visit and search of surface craft. The 
Dutch representatives particularly were apprehen-
sive lest the employme11t of aircraft involve the 
right of deviation. The jurists had to co11tent 
the1nselves in Article 49 with the sn11ple statement 
that "Private aircraft are liable to visit and search 
and to capture by belligerent n1ilitary aircraft.'' 
The technique by which this was to be acco111plished 
'vas 11ot agreed upo11. As the co1nn1ent in the pro-
posed draft says : 
No article on the subject of the exercise by belligerent 
1nilitary aircraft of the right of visit and search of mer-
chant vessels has secured the votes of a majority of the 
Delegations, and therefore no article on the subject is in-
cluded in the code of rules. Nevertheless, all the Dele-
gations are in1pressed with the necessity of surrounding with 
proper safeguards the use of aircraft against merchant 
vessels. Other'"'ise excesses analogous to those which took 
place during the recent war might be reproduced in future 
wars. 
The reason 'v hy no agreed text has been adopted by the 
Commission is due to divergence of view as to what action 
an aircraft should be permitted to take against a merchant 
vessel. 
The aircraft in use today are light and fragile things. 
Except in favourable circumstances they would not be able 
to alight on the water and send a man on board a mer-
chant vessel at the spot where the merchant vessel is first 
encountered ( visite sur place). To make the right of visit 
and search by an aircraft effective it would usually be nee-
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essary to direct the 1nerchant vessels to con1e to some con-
venient locality where the aircraft can alight and send 
men on board for the purpose. This would imply a right 
on the part of the belligerent military aircraft to compel 
the 1nerchant vessel to deviate from her course before it was 
in possession of any proofs derived from an examination 
of the ship herself and her papers that there were circum-
stances of suspicion which justified such interference with 
neutral trade. If the deviation which the merchant vessel 
was obliged to make was prolonged, as might be the case 
•if the aircraft was operating far from land, the losses and 
inconvenience imposed on · neutral shipping would be very 
heavy. 
Is or is not a warship entitled to oblige a merchant vessel 
to deviate from her course for . the purpose of enabling the 
right of visit and search to be carried out? "\Vould an air-
craft be exercising its rights in confor1nity with the rules to 
which surface warships are subject if it obliged a merchant 
vessel to deviate from her course in this way~ Even if a 
'Yarship is entitled on occasion to oblige a merchant vessel 
to deviate fro1n her course before visiting her, can a si1nilar 
right be recognised for military aircraft 'vithout opening 
the door to very great abuses~ 
These are the questions upon 'vhich the views entertained 
by the Delegations differed appreciably, and indicate the 
reasons why it was not found possible to devise any text on 
'v hich all parties could agree. 
With regard to visit and search of aircraft by 
aircraft, ho\vever, it was conceded by all parties, 
as recorded i11 Article 50,. that the special nature 
of the craft n1ade deviation imperative. Two air-
1)la11es simply cannot hoveT in mid-air while one 
of then1 attempts to inspect the other. The laws 
of gravity demand a change in the laws of nations. 
Thus it is permitted to a belligerent airplane to 
order the neutral cTaft to alight in or proceed to 
"a suitable locality reasonably accessible'' for visit 
and search. The principle of the right of devia-
tioi1 is thus established. 
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Problen1s of s£gnalli11g and of landing.-Accord-· 
ing to the general rule, the belligere11t plane 111ust 
signal the neutral plane and then as}{ it to alight. 
It is upon this questio11 as to the n1ethod of sig-
Iilllliilg that international agreement is necessary. 
Should the belligerent plane be expected to ma11eu-
vre into a positio11 fron1 \vhich it ca11 fi1·e a shot 
across the propeller (bow) of the neutral plane~ 
Son1e authorities on air matters maintain that the 
pilot of a 11et1tral pla11e \Yould not be able to know 
whe11 such a Rhot had been fired and that he would 
be informed of the order to la11d only if tl1e shot 
actually hit l1is plane. In s11ch a case, aircraft 
being n1ore fragile a11d delicate than surface ves-
sels, the dan1age committed might be out of all 
proportion to the military 11eeds. For this reaso11 
it is frequently suggested that sumn1ons by shot is 
in1practical and unjustifiable, and that COilllllUili-
catioil or suiniiions 111ust be made jn son1e other 
fashion, probably by radio. 
A radio sun1mo11s \vould be satisfactory if there 
\Yere inter11ational agreeme11t standardizing air-
plane radios and airpla11e sig11als. At the present 
time there is such unifor1nit~7 among surface ves-
sels' radio equipment \vhich are tuned in frequently 
to a particular \Yave lengtl1 for the reception of 
distress signals. In the air, ho\vever, no belliger-
ent plane IlO\Y could be certain that a 11eutral air-
plane \Vas equipped to receive a radio summons. 
l\fisunderstanding a11d confusion can be eliminated 
only by the acloptio11 of an international code on 
this n1atter. Assuming that this difficulty has been 
overcome, other problen1s arise. If the belliger-
ent is certajn that the neutral pla11e has 1111der-
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stood ihe sum111ons and is deliberately 11ot heed-
i11g it, is it justified in using force to bring tl1e 
11eutral plane to~ 011 the surface such a right to 
the exercise of sufficie11t force to carry out a sum-
nlons to halt exists, but this right n1ay be exercised 
'vithout necessarily destroyi11g or dan1aging 
seriously the fleeing ship. 
In the air, however, the frailty of the 11eutral 
. plane may be such that an)r shot capable of bring-
ing it to, might also destroy it. Son1e experts, 
therefore, 'vould deny tl1e belligerent the right to 
use force in this insta11ce, contending that the 
safety of the passengers and personnel of the plane 
ought not to be ptlt in jeopardy merely because of 
a refusal to land for purposes of visit. This, how-
ever, 'vould constitute a serious restrictio11 upon 
belligerent rights, a restraint "\vhich in practice in-
dubitably -vvould be unacceptable. Provided a11_ ac-
Ctlrate means for summoni11g can be agreed upon, 
it does not see1n unreasonable to hold a 11et1tral 
pla11e liable to the consequences of its own refusal 
to heed a legitimate sun1ITIOI1s even though those 
consequences be of the most seriot1s sort. If the 
11eutral plane n1 such circumstances is destroyed 
with complete loss of the lives and property on 
board, it -vvas the fault of the net1tral "rho took the 
risk, 11ot the responsibility .of the belligerent. 
Other qtlestions deserve attention. Suppose the 
11eutral plane is encountered over the high seas and 
cannot alight upon,the.water ~ Suppose the :\Veather 
is so bad that a sudde11landing 'vould be extre1nely 
perilous~ Suppose the 11et1tral plane does not have 
sufficient fuel to enable it to deviate and still reach 
its original destination~ V\7hat is the 1nea11ing of 
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'' unreasonably accessible''~ The preliminary 
Harvard draft code, previo11sly cited, attempts to 
ans,ver these qtleries. Some s11ch standard conven-
tional arrange111ent is indeed an immediate 11eed if 
there is to be any satisfactory regulation of air 
law. I11 all probability the belligerent \viii have to 
be acco1nmodating i11 regard to supplying extra 
fuel if the need occurs, and \vill have to recognize 
\Yeather conditions a11cl the suitability of landing 
arrangen1ents, \vith surface craft cooperating i11 
the visit and search effort as suggested in the Har-
vard code. As to "reasonable accessibility" a ra-
dius of 50 111iles seems a feasible limit for deviation 
at the present time. Future prize court interpre-
tations of the \Vord ''reasonable'' will help to evolve 
a satisfactor~y set of ruli11gs on this as ~yet undeter-
I11ined matter. 
Attack on Chinese co1nn~ercial airplane.-One of 
the first incide11ts i11volving a11 encounter bet\veen a 
military and a comrnercial pla11e \Vas that which 
occurred i11 August 1938 near lVIacao in China. Al-
though technically in this case there \Vas no war 
and although visit of a neutral plane was not nl-
volved, the case sets an interesting precede11t. Par-
ticularly to be noted is the Japanese contention that 
the commercial plane was not clearly marked .. 
The fact that military and commercial aircraft or-
dinarily are 11ot easily distinguishable is an im-
portant one for internatio11al la\v. If confusion 
is to be avoided, agreement must be reached tlpOil 
the proper marl{ing of nonmilitary pla11es. Other-
wise "regrettable incide11ts" will continue to occur. 
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Text of a note presented to the J apa11ese Foreign 
Office by the .American An1bassador at Tokyo, tlpon 
instrt1ctioi1 of the Secretary of State: 
AuGUST 26, 1938. 
ExcELLENCY : 
Acting under instructions, I ha Ye the honor on. behalf of 
n1y Government to protest to Your Excellency against the 
un"·arranted attack on August 24, 1938, near Macao, by 
Japanese airplanes upon a co1nn1ercial airplane operated by 
the China National Aviation Corporation resulting in the 
total destruction of the commercial airplane, the loss of the 
1ives of a number of noncombatant passengers, and the en-
dangering of the life of the A1nerican pilot. 
This attack upon the plane has aroused public feeling in 
the United States. 
I am directed to point out to Your Excellency, ·with refer-
ence to the attack in question, that not only was the life of 
an A1nerican national directly imperilled but loss was also 
occasioned to American property interests as the Pan Amer-
ican Air,vays has a very substantial interest in the China 
National Aviation Corporation. 
I an1 directed to invite the special attention of Your 
Excellency to the following points in the account of Pilot 
Wood: the China National Aviation Corporation plane was 
pursued by Japanese planes 'vhich started n1achine .gun-
ning; after the China National Aviation Corporation plane 
had successfully landed it "·as follow·ed do,vn by Japanese 
pursuit planes which continued to machine gun it until it 
had sunk; and when Pilot Wood started s'vimming across 
the river he was followed by one of the Japanese planes 
which continued to machine gun him. 
My Government desires to express its en1phatic obje~tion 
to the jeopardizing in this way ~f the lives of American as 
w·ell as other noncombatant occupants of unarmed civilian 
planes engaged in clearly recognized and established com-
Inercial services over a regularly scheduled air route. 
I a vail myself (etc.) 
JosEPH C. GRE,v. 
(Press Releases, Vol. XIX, No. 465, pp. 146-147.) 
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Follo\Ying is the text of the J apa11ese 11ote, 
handed to Unit eel States A1nbassador Joseph C. 
Gre\v tonight, replying to tl1e An1erica11 protest of 
August .26 against the destructio11 of a Chi11ese-
An1erican airliner 11ear Canto11 Allgust 24 (Tol(yo, 
Aug. 31): 
)!OXSIE"GR L' . .:\ .. ~IBASSADE"CR: 
I have the honor to acknowledge Your Excellency's note 
of .. A ..ugust 26 stating Your Excellency's protest under in-
structions and on behalf of the .A . .1nerican Government 
against an lllnYarranted attack August 24 near Jiacao by 
,Japanese airplanes upon a com1nercial airplane of the 
China X ational Aviation Corporation resulting in the 
tob1l destruction of said Chinese plane and the loss of the 
Jives of a ntunber of its passengers and endangering the life 
of its A1nerican pilot. 
The incident "~as caused by the C. N . .. ...\ ... C. plane which, 
''ithin the Japanese field of operations, acted in such a 
manner as invited suspicions of its being a Chinese military 
craft, as stated in the follo,-ving report, and 'vhich was 
consequently pursued and attacked by our naval planes in 
the belief that it ''as an enemy plane. 
''
7hile it is to be regretted that this resulted in endanger-
ing the life of an American citizen "~ho happened to be 
the pilot of the plane, as well as the death or wounding 
of nonco1nbatant passengers and crew, the Japanese Gov-
ernnlent. hold the vie'' that the action of their naval planes 
''US not lnnvarranted in the light of the aboYe-Jnentionecl 
circu1nstance. 
It is also their opinion that the con1pany to which the 
aircraft in question belonged being a Chinese juridical 
person. the incident is not one 'vhich involves tT a pan directly 
"~ith any third po"~er. 
Ho,vever, I desire to add that because of the 'vide dis-
crepancies bet"·een the pilot's accounts~ as given in Your 
Excellency's note, and reports in the hands of the Japanese 
Govennnent, further investigations ''ere instituted and the 
follo"~ing ne'v report has been received, which substantially 
confirn1s "·hat )lr. Horinouchi C'Tice )linister for Foreign 
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Affairs) on the occasion of Your Excellency's visit on the 
26th stated on the basis of infor1nation then available. 
I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Ex-
cellency assurances of my highest consideration. 
REPORT 
On the 1norning of the 24th instant five Japanese naval 
airplanes, proceeding in the direction of the Canton-Han-
ko'' raihvay, unexpectedly sighted over Chiautao Island, 
at 9: 30 a. n1., a large-type land plane, bearing no distin-
guishing 1nark, some 2,000 meters away to the north, 'vhich 
'Yas flying tow·ard the west at an altitude of about 2,000 
meters, and attempted to approach the plane for the pur-
pose· of identification. 
1.'he large plane in question, as soon as it discovered our 
naval planes approaching, abruptly turned in a north,ve~t­
erly direction and took flight at full speed, hiding itself in 
the clouds. The approaching 1novement of the naval planes 
'vere made for the purpose of ascertaining the nature of 
the lund plane. 
Ho,vever, seeing the plane flee from the1n, our air squad-
ron concluded in the light of their past experiences that it 
"·as an enen1y plane w·hich caine either to attack our "·ar-
ships or to make reconnaisance and accordingly took an of-
fensive position by placing t"·o planes above and three 
planes belo""" the clouds. Soon after, our planes lying in 
w·ait belo"· the clouds, discovering the supposedly ene1ny 
plane, pursued and attacked it. 
'fhe plane continued to flee by taking advantage of scat-
tered clouds, but was hard pressed by our squadron and 
finally landed in the river on the south side of the delta 
'vhich lies sixteen kilon1eters 'vest of Hungmenchiko·w. 
From the ti1ne they first sighted the plane until the n1o1nent 
it landed our planes 'vere situated directly behind it for 
most of the tiine, so that it was difficult to ascertain its 
character, and our planes were throughout in the belief that 
the land plane was an enemy craft. 
As soon as the latter landed, ho"·ever, our planes de-
scended in order to inspect the spot. ..\"Vhen they reached a 
point above the land plane "~here they could better distin-
guish the type of plane, a doubt arose as to its exact type. 
24 RIGHTS IN REGARD TO AIRCRAFT 
Our planes therefore im1nediately stopped their attack. As 
stated above, there 'vas some ti1ne, though very brief, after 
the landing of the saia plane until doubt caine to be enter-
tained as to its nature, and during that brief period there 
'Yere so1ne among our craft w·hich continued the attack, 
but there 'vas absolutely no n1ore shooting thereafter. 
Our naval planes then dived to t'venty 1neters above the 
"~ater and inspected the landed plane, whereupon the plane 
in question "~us found to be an all-metal Douglas passenger 
plane 'vith no painted n1ark except a Chinese character sig-
nifying "mail" marked on the upper :face o:f its right wing 
and on the right side o:f its body. Our planes left 'vithout 
firing. Our planes sa'v on the landed plane the pilot and 
also a :fe,v passengers near the entrance o:f the passenger 
con1partment in the rear, but they thought as the spot was 
close to the bank o:f the river these men "~ould reach the 
shore (Press Releases, Vol. XIX, No. 466, pp. 156-158.) 
Set~d·ing in to a prize court.-If, in the present 
case, visit and search of the neutral planes yields 
evidence of guilt, the craft should be sent i11 for 
prize court adjudication. It 111ust be reme111bered 
that search is not a11 i11quisition, that there must be 
legal grounds for holding the plane, that 1nere 
suspicion is not enough, and that visit and search 
are an enqt1iry, not a prosecutio11. 
,.Vhereas, according to the principles universally ackno,vl-
edged, a belligerent ship o:f war has, as a general rule and 
except for special circuinstances, the right to stop in the open 
sea a neutral co1nmercial vessel and to proceed to visit and 
search it to assure himself "~hether it is observing the rules 
of neutrality, especially as to contraband; 
'Vhereas, on the other hand, as the legality of every act 
going beyond the limits o:f visit and search depends upon 
the existence either o:f contraband trade or o:f sufficient rea-
sons to believe that there is such, 
as, in this respect, it is necessary to confine oneself to rea-
son8 of a juridical nature; * * * 
as the inforn1ation possessed by the Italian authorities \nts 
of too general a nature and had too little connection "~ith 
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the aeroplane in question to constitute sufficient juridical 
reasons to believe in any hostile destination whatever and, 
consequently, to justify the capture of the vessel which was 
transporting the aeroplane. (The Carthage, G. G. Wilson, 
The Hague Arbitration Cases, p. 365.) 
Airplanes a1td contraband.-The Jurists' Code 
envisages the seizure of neutral pla11es on the 
ground of carrying contraband (Art. 53, Sec. i). 
Undoubtedly in any future war belligerents will 
attempt to intercept contraband comn1erce by air 
ag they have by sea, though special schemes for cer-
tification of neutral airships lil{e one outlined in 
the preliminary Harvard Code may go into effect 
.and so obviate the usual contraband rules. The 
problem of what constitutes ·contraband is not one 
that needs to be resolved here. Possibly every ar-
ticle will be contraband, or perhaps the concept 
will disappear entirely with neutrals and belliger-
·ents agreeing instead upon some sort of certificate 
system. In this instance, if the B-17 were inter-
cepted while actually carrying contraband, the 
plane would be liable to seizure. The air code is 
thus more severe than the surface law rules, for 
according to the jurists' plan, the vessel is liable 
merely for the carriage of contraband while sur-
face merchant ships are not similarly liable unless 
some connection between the ownership of the ves-
sel and that of the goods can be established. That 
is, if the ship's owners can b~ presumed to know 
that the ship is carrying contraband, the ship n1ay 
then be seized. .According to the Declaration of 
London presun1ption of such knowledge exists if-
(ARTICLE 40). * * * The contraband forms, either by 
·value, by "\veight, by volume, or by freight, more than half 
the cargo. 
167533-40-3 
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The penalty for the carriage of contraband, how-
ever, terminates \vith the deposit of the goods. As 
the Jt1rist's Code states in Article 53: 
The ground for capture shall be an act carried out in the 
flight in " '"hich the neutral aircraft can1e into belligerent 
hands, i. e., since it left its point of depa-r'Cure and before it 
reached its point of destination. 
The rule is the san1e for surface ships. 
A capture is not to be made on the ground of a carriage of 
contraband previously accomplished and at the time com-
pleted. (Declaration of London, Art. 38.) 
A vessel's liability to seizure for the carriage of contra-
band usually terminates 'vith the deposit of the contraband 
cargo, unless the voyage has been acco1nplished by 1neans of 
false or simulated papers. (Evans, Cases on International 
La,v, pp. 700, 701 ff.) 
Si11ce the B-17 is encountered "later," that is, 
presumably after it has completed the carriage of 
the contraband, it should be released by the Y -2, 
'vhich should make a record of the visit and search 
in the B-17's log. 
Should the air la~v be '11tore rigor·otts P-The sug-
gestion has been made that the application of the 
Tegular maritime rules by analogy to the aiT is 
unsatisfactory. The argument runs that since an 
airplane travels so much faster than a surface ship, 
a11d since it is capable of making so many more 
voyages, the pe11alty should be more severe. The 
greater effectiveness of the plane for the carriage 
of goods should make for an extension of the liabil-
ity, according to this view. Also, it is said that 
because of the greater difficulty of intercepting air-
craft, the penalty when they are caught should be 
correspondingly more stringent. The la\v in the 
future may move in this direction, but to date it 
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has not, and the solution must be reached on the 
basis of the established practice in maritime cases. 
Airpla1~es a1~d blockade.-There has not yet been 
in practice any attempt to maintain a blockade by 
airplanes but all discus.sions on the laws of war-
fare assume that such a blockade may some day 
be tried. The jurists in 1923 in Article 53 assumed 
such a contingency and gave a belligerent the right 
to seize on the grounds of violation of blockade. 
Students of the proble111 are in accord on the point 
t:hat a blockade maintained by airplanes alone 
would be neither feasible nor possible. It is al-
ways in conjunction with surface vessel that an 
air blockade is considered. It is foreseen, how-
ever, that due to the three-dimensional activity of 
the airplane some change in the type of blockade 
may well come about, and that instead of a block-
ade being thought of in terms of a "line" it will 
be conceived of as more of a zone. Because of the 
ease with which planes might get around the con-
ventional blockade, an increase in the belligerent's 
blockade radius may well be expected. In some 
recent discussions of the problem, it was agreed 
tentatively that a blockade might extend as a zone 
for 50 miles to sea from the enemy coastline. 
Suggestions are not lacking that the concept of 
an air blockade is erroneous, and that it would be 
better to discard entirely blockade terminology 
from air law discussions, substitt1ting instead the 
phrase "barred zone." Witliin such an area all 
travel by neutral or belligerent aircraft might be 
prohibited upon penalty of being fired upon. Visit 
and search as an institution would not be present 
in such a zone. Something analogous to the situ-
ation contemplated in Article 30 of the Jurists' 
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Code may prove n1ore feasible for the air than the 
classic blockade. 
In case the belligerent co1nmanding officer considers that 
the presence of aircraft is likely to prejudice the success of 
the operation in 'vhich he is engaged at the moment, he may 
prohibit the passing of neutral aircraft in the immediate 
vicinity of his forces, or may oblige them to follow a par-
ticular route. A neutral aircraft 'vhich does not conform to 
such directions, of 'vhich he has had notice issued by the 
belligerent co1n1nanding officer, may be fired upon. 
The subject of aircraft a11d blocl{ade was 
thoroughly discussed in the Naval War College In-
-ternational La\v Situation in 1935. 
A blockade maintained by surface vessels only without 
means of preventing or rendering dangerous the passage of 
aircraft or snb1narines 'vould he a "paper blockade" insofar 
as such craft w·ere concerned even though proclaimed to in-
elude these. Any seaplane 1net at sea by a vessel of war may 
be visited and searched to detern1ine its relation to the hostil-
ities, and it may be treated according to the evidence found. 
In recent years, on account of i1nproved means of communi-
cation, it 'vould be difficult to prove ignorance. 
Professor J. M. Spaight in his Air Power and 
War Rights, Second Edition, p. 394 et seq., ex-
plores the problems of air blockade very thorough-
ly, and suggests that "a differe11t degree of effec-
tiveness will probably be de111anded in the air, be-
c~use of the greater difficulty of controlling pas-
sage in that element." 
Pe1~alty for breach of blockade.-Assuming in 
this situatio11, l1o\vever, that an effective blocl{ade 
i11 the air is being mai11tained, it is important to 
decide just \vhen the C-12 was encountered by the 
Y -2. If the C-12 is 011 the outward lap of the 
voyage to the blockaded port, it is liable for breach 
of blocl{ade. 
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A vessel 'vhich in violation of blockade has left a blockaded 
port or has attempted to enter the port, is liable to capture 
so long as she is pursued by a ship of th8 blockading force. 
(Declaration of London, Art. 20.) 
If a vessel has succeeded in escaping from a blockaded port, 
liability to capture continues, according to .L-\..merican opinion, 
until the completion of the voyage; but with the termination 
of the voyage, the offense ends. (Naval ·Instructions Gov-
erning Maritime 1'Varfare, June 30, 1917, No. 31.) 
Therefore, if the Y -2 is a part of the blockading 
force, and meets the C-12 while the latter is pro-
ceeding from the port of 0, the C-12 may be seized. 
Ho"\vever, if the latter has completed the round trip, 
liability has ceased and the C-12 should be released. 
According to the traditional Anglo-An1erican opin-
ion as explained by C. C. Hyde, International Law, 
Vol. II, Page 682, the C-12 is still liable on the re-
turn voyage when met by the Y -2 even if the latter 
is not a member of the blockading squadron. 
Further CommenJ on Blockade.-
N o ter1n in the whole range of maritime law has been the 
subject of greater abuse than that of blockade; and, as it 'vas 
not contended that aircraft could in their present stage of 
development maintain a blockade in the same sense that sur-
face ships can do, there was evident reason to apprehend that 
the anticipatory application to their activities of the term 
blockade would inject into the la'v an additional element of 
uncertainty and confusion capable of vast extension. Under 
the other provisions of the rule a considerable measure of 
power is conceded to belligerents in regard to the control of 
the movements of aircraft in the neighborhood of their mili-
tary operations or military forces, this measure of control 
would evidently be helpful to a surface force maintaining a 
blockade, and to a land force n1aintaining a siege. 1'Vhether 
it is desirable to go further is a question for mature con-
sideration. (John Bassett 1\foore, International Law & Some 
Current Illusions & Other Essays, 1924, p. 207.) 
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"Blockade" is here used in the same sense in which it is 
en1ployed in Chapter 1 of the Declaration of London, that 
is to say, an operation of war for the purpose of preventing 
by ,the use of warships ingress or egress of commerce to or 
from a defined portion of the enemy's coast. It has no 
reference to a blockade enforced without the use of warships, 
nor does it cover military investments of particular local-
ities on land. These operations, which may be termed 
"aerial blockade," were the subject of special examination 
by the experts attached to the various Delegations, who 
framed a special report on the subject for consideration by 
the Full Commission. The conditions contemplated in this 
sub-head are those of warships enforcing a blockade at 
sea with aircraft acting in co-operatioi1 with them. As the 
primary elements of the blockade will, therefore, be mari-
time, the recognised principles applicable to such blockade, 
as for instance, that it must be effective (Declaration of 
Paris, Art. 4), and that it must be duly notified and its 
precise liinits fixed, will also apply. This is intended to be 
sho,vn by the use of the words "breach of blockade duly 
established and effectively maintained" in the text of the 
sub-head. 
It is too early yet to indicate with precision the extent 
to which the co-operation of aircraft in the maintenance of 
blockade at sea n1ay be possible; experience alone can sho,v. 
N eYertheless, it is necessary to indicate the sense in which 
the Commission has used the word "effective." As pointed 
out in the Declaration of London, the effectiveness of a 
blockade is a question of fact. The word "effective" is in-
tended to ensure that it must be maintained by a force 
sufficient really to prevent access to the enemy coast-line. 
The prize court may, for instance, have to consider what 
proportion of surface vessels can escape the watchfulness 
of the blockading squadro'ns w·ithout endangering the ~ffec­
tiveness of the blockade; this is a question 'vhich the prize 
court alone can determine. In the san1e "~ay, this question 
may have to be considered 'vhere aircraft are co-operating 
in the n1aintenance of a blockade. 
The invention of the aircraft cannot iinpose upon a bellig-
erent 'vho desires to institute a blockade the obligation to 
e1nploy aircraft in co-operation 'Yith his naval forces. If 
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he does not do so, the effectiveness of the blockade would 
not be affected by failure to stop aircraft passing through. 
It is only where the belligerent endeavours to render his 
blockade effective in the air-space above the sea as well as 
on the surface itself that captures of aircraft will be made 
and that any question of the effectiveness of the blockade 
in the air could arise. 
The facility with which an aircraft, desirous of entering 
the blockaded area, could evade the blockade by passing out-
side the geographical limits of the blockade has not escaped 
the attention of the Commission. This practical question 
may affect the extent to which belligerents will resort to 
blockade in future, but it does not affect the fact that where 
a blockade has been established and an aircraft attempt to 
pass through into the blockaded area within the limits of 
the blockade, it should be liable to capture. 
The Netherlands Delegation proposed to suppress (i) on 
the grounds that air blockade could not be effectively main-
tained, basing its opinion on its interpretation of the ex-
perts' report on the subject. 
The British, French, Italian and Japanese Delegations 
voted for its maintenance. The American Delegation voted 
for its maintenance ad referendum. (Jurists' Report, 1923, 
Comment upon Art. 53, Sec. i.) 
Visit and search and air mail.-An airplane car-
rying mail is not immune from visit and search. 
According to Hague Convention XI, Relating to 
the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War 
"the inviolability of postal correspondence does 
not exempt a neutral mail ship from the laws and 
customs of maritime war as to neutral merchant 
ships in general'' (Art. 2). There is no legal rea-
son, therefore, why the Y -2 may not order the 
D-20 to alight for visit and search. Though mail 
ships are not immune from belligerent visit and 
search, private correspondence on board is sup-
posed to be inviolable (Hague Convention XI, Art. 
1). The World War experience demonstrated, 
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however, that this inviolability-is exceedingly un-
certaii1, the result of the concessions 1nade by the 
United States bei11g in substance that private mail 
n1ay be opened in oTder that the belligerent may 
detern1ine whether it is inviolable Ol" not. The 
Allied co11tention during the war was that the mail 
privileges \Yere being abused by private persons 
who inserted contTaband articles into their cor-
respo11dence. The \Vhole subject of mails was 
thoroughly revie,ved and studied in Situation II, 
of the Inter11ational Law Situations in 1928. 
The situation when a seacraft endeavors to visit and search 
an aircraft is one involving exceptional dangers to the air-
craft. Mere suspicion does not justify the subjection of air-
craft to undue risk. C'raft carrying n1ails should not be un-
necessarily delayed. The mail carrier does not know what 
are the contents of the mail pouches and i~ not directly con-
cerned 'vith these contents. Guilt cannot be presumed. De-
struction on ground of any act prior to the summons cannot 
easily be justified. (Naval War College Situations, 1928, pp. 
70-71.) 
The D-20 even though it may be a state-owned 
craft, ca1111ot be regarded by the Y -.2 as a military 
plane. In these days of increasing governmental 
o'vnership, \Yith gover11me11ts engaged in all kinds 
of ne'Y activities, the la\v still treats the vessels 
a11d planes O\vned by governn1ents and performing 
non-n1ilitary functions as private craft. e. g. The 
Habana Convention, 1928, Art. 3, op. cit.) The 
D-20 may 11ot be shot do\vn as a n1ilitary plane. 
In conducting visit and search the Y -2 must follow 
the traditional rules applicable to merchant vessels. 
(Jurists' Report, Art. 56, Par. 3.) 
Inas1nuch as the n1ilitary messages, funds, and 
n1ilitary materials were carried in the regular air-
mail, the D-20 was not guilty of unneutral service. 
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It was not engaged in a special voyage, nor was it 
under special charter to a belligerent state. As 
previously remarked, a craft carrying contraband 
even though caught in delicto is not liable unless 
its ovvners or operators could be presumed to know 
the nature of the cargo. The articles here were 
transported in the normal postal pouches, so that 
the D-20 pilot or owner presumably had no knowl-
edge of their contents. It is doubtful whether the 
articles here can be considered as contraband any-
way because they were probably belligerent owned 
emanating as they did from a belligerent port. In 
any case, the D-20 is guilty neither of unneutral 
service nor of carriage of contraband. The fact 
that mere carriage of th8 mails in regular pouches 
is not unneutral service is well explained in Spaight. 
op. cit. page 392 and Oppenheim, I11ternational 
I 
Law, 1935, Vol. II, page 699. Furthermore, the 
liabili(y· for carrying contraband and for unneu-
tral service does not extend beyond the end of the 
voyage in which the craft vvas engaged in such an 
enterprise. The D-20 probably having con1pleted 
the voyage, is no longer subject to penalty. Pos-
sibly, if it were encountered while flying over tl1e 
blockade line, or on a voyage on which it had 
broken the blockade, it could be seized as a block-
ade runner, btlt the facts in this case scarcely 
warrant such a conclusion. 
Contraband and continuo~ts voyage.-The issue 
raised in the case of the E-30 is obviously one of 
''continuous voyage.'' This is really a part of the 
subject of contraband, for "continuous voyage" 
relates to the carriage of contraband articles by an 
indirect route. In contraband there are two ele-
ments, destination and the nature of the goods. 
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There n1ust be an enemy destination and the goods 
1nust be neutral o\vned and of a nature useful for 
, \Yar. '' Conti11uous voyage'' involves the destina-
tion ele1nent in contraband, the belligerent in such 
1natters clain1ing that the goods, though directed 
initially to neutral ports, are actually designed for 
trans-shipment or a continuation of the journey to 
belligerent hands. The doctrine first became im-
portant \Vhen neutrals attempted to circumvent the 
British Rule of 1756, according to wl1ich commerce 
bet\veei1 the Inother country and the colonies, closed 
in peace time to third states, could not be opened 
to neutral ships in tin1e of war. Triangular trade, 
sucl1 as that bet\veen the West Indies, an American 
port, and France, in which American (neutral) 
ships \Vere engaged in carrying articles indirectly 
around t\vo legs of a journey instead of directly be-
t\veen the "Test Indies and France, \vas intercepted 
and conden1ned by the British on the grounds that 
the trade really constituted one ''continuous voy-
age." (The \i\Tillian1, 1806, VI C. Robinson, 316.) 
This doctrine was transferred to contraband and 
blockade during the American Civil War and was 
greatly extended during the last \Var when it really 
becan1e a doctrine of llltimate destination and of 
substitution. The British prize courts condemned 
cargoes \Vhen there \vas no direct evidence that the 
goods \Vere actually going to Ger111any and, instead, 
en1ployed presumptions based upon statistics and 
obscure evide11ce. (The I<:in1, L. R., 1915, p. 215; 
the Baron Stjernblad, L. R. 1918, A. C. 173; The 
Bonna, L. R. 1918, p. 123.) In the last named of 
these, the doctrine of substitution made an appear-
ance in the court's suggestion that even though the 
cocoanut oil on board did not actually go through 
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Sweden to Germany it might enable the Swedes 
to release a certain amount of margarine and butter 
from their ''reservoir of fats'' to Germany. 
The subject of "continuous voyage" has been 
thoroughly treated in previous Naval War College 
Situations and material in this subject will be found 
in the volumes issued in 1922 and 1926. In the 
case of the E-30 the contraband cargo has evi-
dently been deposited, so that the aircraft is no 
longer liable, the rules and argumentation being 
the same as those discussed in Section (a) for the 
B-17. 
Aircraft a1td ~tnne~ttral serv·ice.-The inter-
national law rules in regarq to unneutral service 
for merchant ships have been carried over into the 
law dealing with aircraft. This was recognized in 
Article 53, Section (c) of the Jurist's report 'vhich 
stated that "A neutral private aircraft is liable to 
capture if it * * * is e11gaged in unneutral 
service.'' Other drafts and plans for air law in 
wartime have also assumed that unneutral service 
would be a part of the air rules. Therefore, those 
acts which constitute un11eutral service on the part 
of surface ships 'vill also be unneutral service in 
the air. Maritime and air regulations 'vill thus 
coincide, there being no reason 'vhy the different 
character of aircraft should create the necessity 
for genuinely new regulations or serious modifica-
tions in the old. 
ART. 45. A neutral vessel is liable to be condemned and in 
a general way, is liable to the same treatment which a neu-
tral vessel would undergo when liable to condemnation on 
account of contraband of war. 
(1) If she is making a voyage specially with a vie'v to the 
transport of individual passengers who are embodied in the 
36 RIGHTS IN REGARD TO AIRCRAFT 
ar1ned force of the enemy, or 'vith a vie\V to the transmission 
of information in the interest of the enemy. 
(2.) If, 'vith the knowledge of the o'vner, of the one who 
' charters the vessel entire, or of the n1aster, she is transporting 
a 1nilitary detaclnnent of the ene1ny, or one or more persons 
'rho, during the yoyage, lend direct assistance to the opera-
tions of the enemy. In the cases specified in the preceding 
paragraphs (1) and (2), goods belonging to the owner of the 
vessel are like,Yise liable to condemnation. 
The provisions of the present Article do not apply if when 
the vessel is encountered at sea she is una,vare of the opening 
of the hostilities, or if the master, after becoming aware of 
the opening of hostilities, has not been able to disembark the 
passengers. The vessel is deemed to know of the state of 'var 
if she left an enemy port after the opening of hostilities, or a 
neutral port after there had been made in sufficient time a 
notification of the opening of hostilities to the Power to 'vhich 
such port belongs. · ' 
AnT. 46. A neutral vessel is liable to be condemned and, in 
a general "'~'ay, is liable to the same treatinent 'vhich she 'vould 
undergo if she 'vere a 1nerchant-vessel of the enemy: 
( 1) If she takes a direct part in the hostilities. 
(2) If she is under the orders or under the control of an 
agent placed 011 board by the ene1ny Government. 
(3) If she is chartered entirely by the enemy Govern1nent. 
( 4) If she is at the ti1ne and exclusively either devoted to 
the transport of ene1ny troops or to the transmission of infor-
nlation in the interest of the enemy. 
In the cases specified in the present Article, the goods be-
longing to the o'vner of the vessel are like,vise liable to 
condmnnation. 
AnT. 47. Any individual embodied in the armed force of 
the enmny and 'vho is found on board a neutral merchant-
vessel, may be made a prisoner of 'var, even though there be no 
ground for the capture of the vessel. (Declaration of Lon-
don, 1909.) 
U nneutral service has been discussed previously 
in Naval War College Situations, the 1928 volume 
dealing carefully with this subject. In the resume 
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that year, page 106, is found the following 
conclusion : 
'Vhile there has been a tendency to extend the scope of un-
neutral service, it is evident from practice., instructions, deci-
sions, etc., that the principles of the Declaration of London 
of 1909 were general1y accepted at the beginning of the World 
War in 1914. vVhere extreme action "\Vas taken during the 
World War on the ground of reprisals such action followed 
no precedent based on general practice. 
The essence of unneutral service, or rather 
its chief ingredient, consists in the undertaking 
specially to perform some service for a belligerent. 
By engaging in such special undertakings, the neu-
tral ship or plane divests itself of its normal com-
mercial character and :performs a military job. 
Unneutral service is thus distinguishable from 
contraband because in the latter the neutral ship 
is engaged in con1n1ercial enterprise, while in the 
former it is participating directly in a belliger-
ent's affairs. Where an airplane like the G-40 is 
carrying a belligerent general under a special char-
ter it is clearly engaged in unneutral service for 
which the penalty is the seizure of the plane. If 
the general took passage on a regular commercial 
flight, and if the ship and its owners did not go out 
of their way to accommodate the general, there 
would be no liability. For a clear analysis of air 
law i11 regard to unneutral service see Spaight, op. 
cit., page 390 et. seq. 
Period of liability for t(;1t1teutral serv·ice by air-
craft.-In the present case of the G-40 if that 
plane has completed the round trip journey from 
the port in state G to the military headquarters of 
state X, its liability is at an end provided, as above 
i11dicated, the usual maritime law is made applica-
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ble in toto to the air. In regard to penalty, how-
ever, there is some indication that for aircraft, 
liability is not discharged \vhen the special service 
is terminated. In Article 6 of the Jurists' code 
it is stipulated that where a neutral vessel or air-
craft transmits infor111ation to a belligerent con-
cerning military operations, "liability to capture 
* * * is not extinguished by the conclusion of 
the voyage or flight on \vhich the vessel or aircraft 
was engaged at the time, but shall subsist for a 
period of one year after the act complained of.'' 
Thus the air rules regarding penalty for unneu-
tral service may become more stringent in the fu-
ture. The fact that an airplane can deviate 
11owadays so easily and is relatively so mobile and 
swift that it can perform special services more 
frequently and expeditiously than can surface ves-
sels i11dicates that for air law the period of liability 
will probably be longer than it has been for 
maritime law. 
Resume.-Although at the present time there are 
no binding rules of international law in regard 
to the conduct of hostilities in the air, and in re-
gard to neutral and belligerent rights in the air, 
it is apparent that most of the conceptions and 
many of the rules of maritime law \viii be car-
ried over into the rules for the air. The traditional 
rights of visit and search and of seizure on the 
grounds of contraband, blockade, and unneutraJ 
service \viii belong to belligerents in future con.& 
flicts. International agreeme11t on the application 
of these rights is desperately needed. Because of 
the difficulties i11volved i11 carrying out visit and 
search, difficulties inl1erent in the nature of air-
craft, future belligerents 111ay be tempted to dis-
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pense e11tirely with restraints and to shoot down 
neutral and enemy craft more or less indiscrim-
inately. For the avoidance of such an unfortu-
nate state of affairs, it is imperative that practical 
rules be devised. 
The technique of visit and search in the air must 
be evolved with proper regard for the nature of 
aircraft. Unlike merchant vessels, aircraft must 
deviate in order to undergo visit and search, and 
agreement must be arrived at on such matters as 
proper landing places, weather conditions, and fuel 
supplies. It is essential, too, that nations make a 
convention on the method of signalling a neutral 
plane, it being probable that the traditional shot 
''across the bo'v'' will not be feasible, and it being 
necessary further to establish uniformity in air-
plane radio sets, equipment for receiving, etc. 
The air may bring modifications in the customary 
la,vs and rules relating to contraba11d and block-
ade. The high speeds of planes and the ease with 
which they can cross a line of blockade, may cause 
belligerents and neutrals to agree upon some sort of 
certificate scheme in the place of the conventional 
visit and search for contraband, and upon a ''barred 
zone'' in lieu of the old-time maritime blockade. 
Tentative agreements upon some of these matters, 
particularly those relating to the methods of sig-
nalling for visit and search, shollld be sought im-
mediately, though the experience of future con-
flicts, if and when they come, 'viii play a leading 
role in the development of the law. 
As for the penalties involved in carriage of con-
traband, breach of blockade, and u11neutral serv-
ice, a tendency to,vards a greater severity is dis-
tinctly discernible. Facilities possessed by aircraft 
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for eluding capture and for - making frequent 
trips, 1nake it 11ot unreasonable for the law to ex-
tend the period of liability beyond that customarily 
' possessed by surface vessels. Planes may not, 
therefore, expect imn1unity when they have de-
posited contraband or terminated their act of 
unneutral service. 
For the present, given the absence of formulated 
rules, the solution to air problems must be sought 
to a great extent upon the basis of analogy to 
maritime law, with distinct modifications, how-
ever, where these are called for by reason of the 
nature of aircraft. Althot1gh it has not been cus-
tomary i11 inter11ational law to co11cede favors or 
privileges to new weapons because they possessed 
special handicaps or weaknesses, the laws of 
physics, that is, the fact that airplanes move in a 
three-dimensional realm and cannot stand still in 
the air, force modifications in the rllles, not as a 
matter of special privilege, but as a n1atter of abso-
lute necessity. This does not mean, therefore, that 
belligerent aircraft can claim freedom from legal 
restrictions merely because it is difficult to conform 
to formerly accepted principles. It does mean that 
the legal restraints 111ust be adapted to the peculiar 
needs of the air. Nor may neutral craft claim spe-
cial privileges merely because airplanes are rela, 
tively frail, and because the exercise of belligerent 
force might endanger the whole craft. An adjust-
ment of risks and restraints can be made upon the 
basis of established principles with neutrals ac-
cepting interference with their air commerce and 
belligerents abandoning any pretentious to ruth-
lessness and arbitrary actions. The great bellig-
erent-neutral compromises on visit and search, 
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contraband, blockade and unneutral service may 
be continued with necessary changes occasioned by 
the nature of the medium involved. 
SOLUTION 
In each instance the Y -2 may lawfully visit and 
search the neutral aircraft. 
(a) The B-17 should be released. 
(b) If the Y -2 is a member of the blockading 
squadron and if it meets the C-12 while the latter 
is engaged on the return voyage, the C-12 should 
be seized and held for prize court adjudication. If 
the Y -2 encounters the C-12 after the latter bas 
completed the round trip journey, the C-12 should 
be released. If the Y -2 is not a member of the 
blockading squadron but meets the C-12 while the 
latter is 011 the return trip, the 0-12 may be seized 
and held for prize court adjudication. 
(c) The D-20 should be released. 
(d) The E-30 should be released. 
(e) If the G-40 is no longer under special char-
ter, and if it has completed the journey for which 
it 'vas hired, it should be released. 
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